PR and the ‘far right’

While any true democrat will accept the need for proportional pepresentation (PR), fears have been raised in some quarters – in particular following November’s election in the Netherlands – that PR somehow ‘favours’ the far right, or at least is not good at blocking far right parties. Let’s look at the facts.

Firstly, we need to understand what PR is intended to achieve: the creation of an elected body which matches as closely as possible the views of the electorate. In theory, then, PR has nothing necessarily to do with parties but for convenience’s sake this article takes PR to mean the PR of parties. It is not intended to preserve the centre ground or act as a stabilising force.

PR: common systems of democratic representation

The purest and simplest form of PR is Single Transferable Vote (STV), advocated by the Electoral Reform Society. It ensures the PR of parties, tendencies within parties and cross-party opinion. It takes the common-sense approach of determining the quota – the minimum number of votes needed to elect one MP – and then dividing each grouping’s share of votes by the quota.

One fairly common form of PR is d’Hondt or ‘largest average’ which arbitrarily divides each grouping’s share of votes by 1, 2, 3 etc. then awards one seat per divisor. It is non-monotonic, meaning that any trends are not exaggerated. For example, assume there are parties A, B and C competing for five seats. A wins 500 votes, B 300 and C 240. A wins three seats, the others one each. At the next election the voting figures are exactly the same except that B and C run a joint list. This time they win three seats and A only two. D’Hondt tends to favour larger groupings over smaller ones.

Some countries arbitrarily impose a threshold or bar so that only groupings that win more votes than the bar – often 3 or 5% of the total – are able to share in the allocation of seats. Not only is this patently anti-democratic – by its very nature it fails to create an elected body which matches the views of the electorate – but it automatically favours larger parties (those who win more than the threshold). For example, in the Saarland Landtag election of March 2022 the SPD won 43.5% of the votes, but 56.9% of the seats because 22.2% of the electorate – nearly a fifth! – voted for parties which failed to cross the 5% threshold. This result is even less democratic than the UK in 2019 when the Conservatives got 43.6% of votes but 56.2% of seats.

PR in practice

Enough of the theory; now for the practice. Eight EU member states held national elections in 2023 (Greece twice). It is instructive to look at the results.

For the purposes of this article ‘far right’ means any party to the right of conventional conservative parties plus, in countries bordering Russia, any party descried as ‘Russophile’ (since Russia is a fascist state), together with climate change deniers anti-vaxxers, anti-immigrant groups, hardline Euro-sceptics and others. Feel free to disagree.

First up was Estonia on 5 March. There the Conservative Party (described as ‘right to far right’) won 17 of the 101 seats instead of its PR entitlement of 16. This is because Estonia uses d’Hondt and imposes a 5% bar. The party’s support fell from 17.8 to 16.1%. The Conservative Party is not part of the post-election government.
(Source: National Electoral Committee).

Then there was Finland on 2 April which uses d’Hondt without a bar. The Finns Party (described as ‘right-wing populist’) won 20.1% of the vote and 46 of the 200 seats – six more than its proportional entitlement. A scatter of five other far-right parties won 1.3% of the vote between them and, not surprisingly, no seats. After the election the Finns Party was invited to join the coalition government, although another configuration would have been possible.
(Source: Election Information and Results Service).

Bulgaria (also on 2 April) uses a variant of STV for allocating seats, but with a 4% bar. The far-right parties are Revival, Bulgarian Rise, Neutral Bulgaria, Conservative Union of the Right, Out of EU and NATO, People’s Voice and Bulgarian National Union – New Democracy. Together they won 17.7% of the vote. (Source: Electoral Commission of Bulgaria).

Then we have the first of two elections (21 May) in Greece which used a 3% bar. Five far right parties took part: Greek Solution, Victory, United People’s Front (aka Alliance of Subversion), National Creation and Assembly of Greeks (not just far right but anti-semitic, too). Together they won 9.4% of the vote.
(Source: Ministry of the Interior).

This was followed by Spain (on 23 July) which uses d’Hondt. Constituencies vary in size, depending on population (not number of registered voters) and in smaller constituencies larger parties will inevitably benefit more from d’Hondt. A grand total of 61 parties took part – at least 34 of them being regionalists. The far-right parties are: Vox, Caminando Juntos (‘Walking Together’, a breakaway group from Vox) and Falange Española. Between them they won 12.4% of the votes, almost all of which for Vox (down by 2.7%) which won 33 of the 350 seats or 9.4%; so certainly not ‘favoured’ by PR.
(Source: Boletín Oficial del Estado (209): 122201–122274. 1)

There was a second election in Greece on 25 June which we can cheerfully ignore. The government had reintroduced the provision (applicable to all elections before May) whereby the party with most votes is awarded an additional 50 seats on top of its proportional entitlement. Ancient Athenian ‘democracy’ was pretty rubbish, but this is beyond a joke.

Slovakia (30 September) uses a form of d’Hondt but with a complicated system of thresholds: 5% for single parties, 7% for coalitions of two or three parties, and 10% for coalitions of four or more parties). Which of the competing parties are far right? The incoming prime minister’s party Smer – sociálna demokracia (direction – social democracy – don’t be fooled by the name) has been suspended from the Party of European Socialists and is Russophile, so I have included it with the other far right parties. They are Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party), Republika, Sme rodina (We are Family) and Ľudová strana naše Slovensko (People’s Party our Slovakia – neo-nazi). Between them they won 36.4% of the vote and 52 of the 150 seats. (34.7%). Robert Fico, leader of Smer – sociálna demokracia, is the new prime minister.
(Source: volbysr.sk)

Moving northwest we have Luxembourg on 8 October which uses a variation of STV in four constituencies where the number of MPs reflects population size rather than electorate. This traditionally benefits the DP (Democratic Party) of outgoing prime minister Xavier Bettel which is strong in the capital … where more than 50% of the population are foreigners and hence not entitled to vote). The far right consists of the ADR (Alternative Democratic Reform – populist, but not fascist) with 9.3% of the vote and Liberté – Fräiheet! founded by a dissident member of the ADR (1.13%). The ADR won 5 seats out of 60 or 8.3%.
(Source: https://elections.public.lu/en.html)

Further to the east is Poland (15 October) which uses D’Hondt with a 5% threshold for single parties and citizen committees and an 8% threshold for coalitions. As we know the election marked an important shift from the (far) right under PiS (Law and Justice) to the centre led by Donald Tusk. The United Right consists of four parties standing under the ‘Confederation’ banner. Two can be considered ‘far right’: Law and Justice and Kukiz’15 (founded by Paweł Kukiz). There were other, minor far right parties and groupings. The total vote share of these parties came to 37.1%, their seats to 177 (= 38.1%).
(Source: National Electoral Commission, https://wybory.gov.pl/sejmsenat2023/en/dane_w_arkuszach)

Finally, we come to the Netherlands which had an election on 22 November using D’Hondt. The bar is 0.67% – enough to win one of the 150 seats. The election result caused panic in various EU countries because the top-scoring party has pronounced anti-muslim, anti-immigration, far right and Eurosceptic views. Seven parties that can be considered far right contested the election. They are: the PVV (Wilders’ party), BBB or Farmer-Citizen movement, FvD (Forum for Democracy, a breakaway from the PVV), Ja21, Belang van Nederland (NL’s interest), Samen voor NL (Together for NL) and the Libertarian party. Together they won 31.65% of the votes and 50 out of 150 seats (33.3%).
(Source: Kiesraad).

The process of government formation is under way (and it usually takes a very long time). There is no reason why the emerging coalition should necessarily include the PVV. Watch this and other spaces.

Regional government

Finally, it is worth looking at several elections at subnational level in Germany in 2023: four Landtag elections in Berlin, Bremen, Bavaria and Hesse.

Berlin (12 February) mimics the system used for federal elections: i.e. roughly half the seats are elected by First Past The Post (FPTP) and the other half are used to ensure the overall result gives proportional representation of the competing parties. The far right was represented by the AfD, Die Basis (Grassroots Democracy), the NDP and the almost extinct Republikaner. Together they won 9.7% of the vote (up 0.4% since the previous election) and won 17 seats (10.7% of total) – all AfD. The anti-democratic threshold clause (5%) ensured that 16.5% of voters were unrepresented and parties gaining more than 5% were correspondingly at an advantage.
(Source: https://wahlen-berlin.de/wahlen/BE2023/AFSPRAES/agh/index.html).

In Bremen (14 May) the Bürgerschaft is elected in two multi-member constituencies corresponding to the two parts of the state: the city of Bremen and the city of Bremerhaven. A 5% threshold is applied independently in both areas. 72 members are elected in Bremen and 15 in Bremerhaven, for a total of 87 seats in the Bürgerschaft. Seat distribution is calculated using the Sainte-Laguë method (an improvement on D’Hondt). In March 2023, the state electoral committee disqualified the AfD from running in the election due to the attempts of two different groups of party officials, both claiming to be the legitimate party executive, submitting competing lists. The far right consisted of BiW, Bürger in Wut (enraged citizens) and Die Basis (as in Berlin), winning 9.4 and 0.8% respectively. BiW won ten seats (two more than its proportional entitlement). (Source: Wahlen Bremen).

Bavaria (8 October) uses essentially the same system as Berlin. Here the far right was represented by the AfD and Die Basis which together won 15.5% of the votes (14.6% and 0.9% respectively). The AfD won 28 seats (3 more than its proportional entitlement), Die Basis none. The outgoing coalition of CDU and Freie Wählern remained in office, with 122 of 203 seats. (Source: Wikipedia)

Hessen (also 8 October) uses the fairly standard half FPTP and half compensatory PR system. Here, too, the far right was represented by the AfD and Die Basis which won 18.4% and 0.5% of the vote respectively and 28 seats (all AfD). (Source: Wikipedia).

The following table summarises the results for the far right parties of these elections (with subnational elections in italics).
%V = percentage of votes obtained by all far right parties;
%S = percentage of seats obtained by all far right parties.
Diff = the difference between the two scores.
In govt? = did any of the far right parties end up in the post-election government?

The positive differences are due to electoral thresholds being applied. Any party exceeding the threshold benefits to some extent.

Regaining the initiative

These election results show that PR does not favour far right parties. Setting aside the distorting effect of having a threshold clause, it is quite clear that these parties received more-or-less their proportional entitlement. And this is just as true of the mainstream right, the centre, mainstream left, greens etc.

A comparison of elections in other EU or non-EU Member States could well paint a different picture, of course. And a comparison of election results over time would also be instructive.

All of these counties and the German Länder have decades of experience of PR and of coalition government. Far right parties have been able to participate in these elections from the beginning, if that is what the voters want.

As to ‘blocking’ the far right, if PR means PR it cannot and should not have a blocking effect. There is a clue in the word ‘proportional’.

This is not to deny that far right parties appear to be on the rise in Europe, and they are expected to do well in European Parliament elections later this year. But the panic reaction of scrapping PR or banning those parties would simply inflame their supporters (and others, too). What the mainstream parties should be saying is: ‘The far right are doing well. Where have we gone wrong? And how can we regain the initiative?’

A decent educational programme would be a good start. We should also remember that, at a time of economic crisis (e.g. in the UK today), those who feel disadvantaged are likely to lash out and blame any convenient minority and start voting for whoever is willing to attack that minority and divert attention from the real problems. Democrats must have the courage to fight back.

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