If, like me, you watched the BBC’s 4-part docu-drama Titanic Sinks Tonight over Christmas and New Year, you may have been deeply saddened by the circumstances of the tragedy and the deadly consequences for the victims.
I was a Marconi Marine radio officer in the early 1960s. I sailed across the North Atlantic many times in both winter and summer, sometimes encountering ice. Therefore, I was particularly interested in the programme’s historic interviews with the Titanic’s wireless operators, the account of their experiences, and the efforts made to obtain assistance from nearby ships.
1912 compared with the 1960s
There were huge differences in the type and quality of radio equipment between 1912 and the 1960s. In 1912, the use of radio at sea was in its infancy. Not all ships were equipped with radio stations, the equipment was of limited reliability and range, and only informal or inconsistent protocols for communication between ships existed. There was no radar. The international distress signal, SOS, had only recently been agreed internationally and had not yet been widely adopted.
The Titanic tragedy has been debated endlessly by historians. I have not studied the Titanic history deeply, so my comments below are personal, not historically definitive.
How and why did the Titanic hit an iceberg?
The 50,000-ton Titanic, with approximately 2,200 people aboard, was steaming at full speed, 21.5 knots, 370 miles south-southwest of Newfoundland, south of Greenland (an area known as Iceberg Alley, where icebergs drift southward), on a dark, moonless night, in April, which is the middle of the iceberg season (February to June).
Naked-eye visibility was very limited. When the iceberg ahead was seen, there was insufficient time to alert the bridge and change course. Titanic struck the iceberg (11.40pm, 14 April 1912) at such speed and with such momentum, becoming holed in several places on the starboard side, that it was almost certainly doomed, despite all the watertight compartments, and it sank two and a half hours later.
Captain Smith is described in the series as a man of great sea-going experience. In my view, allowing his ship to steam at that speed, in that area and in those conditions, was foolhardy and grossly irresponsible. Accounts differ, however. Some describe him as diligent and honourable, arguing that he was only following standard practice for sea journeys in that region at the time. The White Star Line also advertised its reliable port-arrival timetables.
My own ship, an 8,000 ton freighter, would reduce speed, perhaps to around 6 knots, when in or near ice, even though we had radar permanently on. If the Titanic had been steaming at 6 knots rather than 21, it would, with the benefit of hindsight, have had over three times longer to change course once the iceberg ahead had been spotted visually. If it had still hit the iceberg, but at that lower speed, the damage inflicted would have been far less.
Why was the loss of life so high?
The BBC series suggested the main reasons for the high loss of life were:
- Insufficient lifeboat capacity. There were lifeboat spaces for only around 900 people. There were just 710 survivors. Not all lifeboat capacity was used and around 1,500 people were left to drown.
- Excessive delay by the captain in assessing and understanding the damage to the ship, concluding it was a dire emergency, and ordering a radio distress call be sent requesting assistance.
- The ‘Californian’, a ship possibly as little as just 12 miles away, could have pulled alongside the sinking Titanic and transferred everyone to safety, but did not do so. This was because of shameful (at least in hindsight) confusion between the two captains and the wireless operators on both ships, and inexplicably negligent decisions by Captain Stanley Lord of the Californian.
- The ‘Carpathia’, another ship, which was 50 miles and four hours’ steaming away, responded to the Titanic’s distress call, arrived at the scene after the Titanic had sunk, and picked up 710 survivors from the lifeboats. It could have arrived sooner and saved more lives, but the Titanic’s wireless operator missed receiving a message from Carpathia because he was transmitting and receiving multiple radio exchanges, and because of the belated arrival of the distress call requesting assistance.
- Confusion and lack of training among Titanic’s officers and crew about managing an emergency.
- Inadequate communication between crew and passengers. Passengers and many crew members were left completely uninformed about the seriousness of the danger.
- The class hierarchy. First-class passengers were informed earlier of the emergency, were better prepared with clothing and lifejackets, were present on the boat deck earlier, and were helped into the lifeboats earlier. Sixty-one percent of first-class passengers (around 97% of first-class women) survived but just 24% of third class.
- Deference to the Captain. Captain Smith appears in the series as an unapproachable man, absorbed in his own thoughts. His interactions with the ship’s officers were formal, terse and brief. The captain’s personality appeared unlikely to inspire confidence or trust. His decisions seem to have been poor, muddled and far too late, lacking inclusiveness and openness.
Board of Trade inquiry
Subsequent inquiries were held by the British Board of Trade, and the US Senate. The British one was highly technical, recommending that more lifeboats must be carried, more training and drilling of the crew, the need for 24-hour radio watch-keeping, more equipment to be carried on board lifeboats, and a number of other measures.
The ‘cause’ of the accident was attributed to ‘hitting an iceberg at speed’, but Captain Smith, now deceased, was not reprimanded. Criticism was directed at the captain of the Californian, Stanley Lord, but not at the Board of Trade, White Star Line, or the ship’s design.
Subsequently, there was some criticism that the report was a whitewash and that no one was held accountable.
The US Senate inquiry
The Senate report’s key findings were:
- A lack of emergency preparations had left Titanic‘s passengers and crew in “a state of absolute unpreparedness”, and the evacuation had been chaotic: “No general alarm was given, no ship’s officers formally assembled, no orderly routine was attempted or organized system of safety begun”.
- The ship’s safety and life-saving equipment had not been properly tested.
- Titanic‘s Captain Edward Smith had shown an “indifference to danger [that] was one of the direct and contributing causes of this unnecessary tragedy”.
- The lack of lifeboats was the fault of the British Board of Trade, “to whose laxity of regulation and hasty inspection the world is largely indebted for this awful tragedy.
- The SS Californian had been “much nearer [to Titanic] than the captain is willing to admit” and the British Government should take “drastic action” against him for his actions.
- J. Bruce Ismay (Chairman of White Star Line) had not ordered Captain Smith to increase extra speed, but Ismay’s presence on board may have contributed to the captain’s decision to do so.
- Third-class passengers in many cases had not realised until it was too late that the ship was sinking.
The report was strongly critical of established seafaring practices and the roles that Titanic’s builders, owners, officers and crew had played in contributing to the disaster. It highlighted the arrogance and complacency that had been prevalent aboard the ship and more generally in the shipping industry and the British Board of Trade.
Recommendations were made for new regulations to be imposed on passenger vessels wishing to use American ports:
- Ships should slow down when entering areas known to have drifting ice and should post extra lookouts.
- Navigational messages should be brought promptly to the bridge and disseminated.
- There should be enough lifeboats for all on board.
- All ships equipped with wireless sets should maintain communications at all times, day and night.
- New regulations were needed to govern the use of radiotelegraphy.
- Boat drills should be carried out for passengers.
- Rockets should be fired by ships at sea only as distress signals.
Wider Lessons from the tragedy
Modern, internationally enforced regulations are an essential component of a caring and civilised society. There are constant sneers from the political right about burdensome red tape. Jacob Rees-Mogg, in the last government, called for a ‘bonfire of the regulations’. What irresponsible, populist nonsense.
Pre-agreed decision-making processes are vital. On both the Titanic and Californian there were intransigent, remote captains who took critical decisions and made them badly without significant input from their experienced officers. While the chain of command requires an ultimate decision-maker, decisions should be made on the best available information and advice.
Timely post-tragedy ‘independent’ inquiries are vital. In contrast to today’s endlessly prolonged and costly inquiry system, the two inquiries following the sinking of the Titanic were both completed within three months, and implementation of the recommendations commenced immediately, benefiting everyone.
Class divisions and hierarchies. Neglect of the third-class and preferential treatment of the first-class passengers was disgraceful.
Proper communications during emergencies. Poor or non-existent communication added to panic and cost lives. This is evident in many UK disasters and emergencies, where stunned people wander around without official advice, and officialdom has no effective support or communication plan.
The lessons learnt from the Titanic highlight that strong regulations, clear communication, and accountability are not just bureaucratic hurdles; they are essential safeguards that can save lives.
Any thoughts? Send them to editor@westenglandbylines.co.uk.
