The Labour government under Keir Starmer is often described as pandering too far to both the left and right; either as a party with no backbone and no committed political vision, or as a pragmatic, technocratic party aiming to win a broad range of voters. So far, the former has been the case.
Labour seems politically adrift, crowded out by parties with more strongly defined identities. Yet this is not a trap that only Starmer has fallen into, as leaders across history have attempted similar policies of appeasement. While this has often led to disaster, it has just as often led to stability and cohesion. So, with this in mind, what are some examples of this phenomenon and what can Starmer’s Labour learn from a history of political indecision?
Warnings from the past
One of the most infamous examples of attempted crowd-pleasing policy is found in Mikhail Gorbachev, the eighth and final leader of the Soviet Union. While the USSR’s collapse may have been inevitable, Gorbachev’s attempts to reform while containing conservative resistance, arguably accelerated its breakup. He was simultaneously too progressive and not progressive enough, lacking the resolve to hold his struggling superpower together.
When compromise collapses
However, Gorbachev’s indecisive policy does not exist in isolation. The Second Spanish Republic struggled to reconcile deep ideological divisions, but ultimately pleased neither side, leading to the brutal Spanish Civil War and culminating in Francisco Franco’s dictatorship in 1939.
The French Second Republic of 1848 promised a new democratic state, but its attempts to balance the demands of the working class and bourgeoisie failed, contributing to Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte seizing power in 1851 and becoming emperor in 1852.
Closer to home, 17th century England’s religious and constitutional tensions, including attempts to reconcile the demands of Puritanism, Anglicanism, and Presbyterianism, contributed to the instability that ultimately enabled Oliver Cromwell’s rise to power in 1653.
When the centre holds
While these examples are extreme, they represent just a few of many instances where political appeasement and blurred political identity led to unrest, instability, and extremism. However, for each of these damning cases, there exist mirror cases where adept political actors have employed middle-way policies to great success.
Following the Great Depression, Franklin D Roosevelt managed to construct a durable electoral coalition that spanned working-class voters, minorities, and parts of the business community through his ‘New Deal’, helping restore stability and public confidence. He reshaped the American state and redefined the relationship between government and the economy for a generation.
Similarly, Elizabeth I became Queen of an England existentially divided on religious lines, but her moderate and accommodating policies secured profound stability. This triggered what is widely considered to be the ‘golden age’ of English history.
Furthermore, following the Second World War, as economics minister and later chancellor, Ludwig Erhard steered West Germany into a period of stability and prosperity. He implemented the ‘social market economy’, which balanced free-market capitalism with social welfare, commanding broad support.
Why the middle way emerges
Britain today is not revolutionary France or collapsing Russia. But the political lesson about clarity and delivery still applies. Therefore, it does seem that Labour’s widely criticised political ambiguity is not entirely unfounded.
It is crucial to recognise that this policy is most often pursued following a period of significant unrest. Whether the result of economic difficulty, violent conflict, or ideological division, the ‘middle-way’ is often perceived as the antidote to instability. It seems likely that Starmer identified a Britain crippled by Brexit, Covid, and political division, and looked towards indistinction for stability, unity, and prosperity. However, Starmer is currently far more Gorbachev than Roosevelt in this pursuit. So, how did he get it so wrong when others got it so right, and what can he learn?
What Starmer must do
First, Labour must define a ‘Starmerism’ that is as distinct as Erhard’s Social Market Economy and ensure that this identity arises from a position of leadership, not reaction. One of Gorbachev’s mistakes was to define himself by what he was reforming away from, rather than what he was building towards.
Conversely, figures such as Roosevelt did not merely react to their populations’ varying demands but synthesised them. He created an entirely new political identity born from what came before. Starmer successfully came to power by rejecting Conservatism and Corbynist Labour, and so far appears to be reacting to issues as they arise. However, this is not a political identity or a strategy for running a country.
To succeed, Starmer must build a political identity strong enough to reshape the political conversation and not merely ignore it, and advance policies that clearly align with that identity. The success of middle-way policy comes from defining the centre on his own terms rather than merely occupying it.
Delivery matters more than positioning
Secondly, and perhaps most problematically, the Labour government must deliver tangible economic prosperity. Governments without a clear ideological edge survive only if they deliver economic results. FDR’s ‘New Deal’ helped stabilise the economy and restore confidence and put people back to work.
Without the public feeling any improvement in their pockets, Starmer’s ideological indecision will be seen as the problem, not the solution. He is exposed to attacks from both the left and right without a secure base and is ultimately setting himself up for failure without concrete results.
Thirdly, total consensus is both dangerous and impossible. When a middle-way government appears weak or indecisive, as with those that preceded Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte or Cromwell, extremism takes hold. Labour must find specific, high-profile battles to prove it is more than a people-pleaser and demonstrate that it is willing to alienate certain groups in favour of a core vision.
While it is important for Starmer to control the fringes, he must not confuse this with pandering to them. Elizabeth I did not succeed by pandering to the Puritans and Catholics; she succeeded by forming a state that functioned regardless of their approval. Much the same applies to Starmer’s success. He should not aim to please the political fringes, but to build a broad majority that views the extremes as irrelevant to the running of the country
Between strategy and self-destruction
Ultimately, ideological indecision is a strategy that has shaped governments across history. While often used to remarkable effect, it has just as often resulted in the fall of political systems and the rise of autocracy. Therefore, the line that Starmer currently walks is a fine one.
To succeed, he must learn from both the successes and failures of previous leaders who governed from the centre. However, as it stands, he seems to be struggling to define himself politically; rejected by all sides of the political spectrum and left in no man’s land, with no base to support him.
Note: A version of this article also appears in the Leeds Policy Institute.
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