Part 1 of this review followed Churchill, then in opposition, to the Congress of Europe in Spring of 1948. Part 2 charts Churchill in power and his failure to realise a Britain in Europe.
The Council of Europe, the European Assembly and the European Movement
Back in London in early 1948, Churchill organised a march with 20 of his allies from Westminster to Downing Street to confront the Prime Minister on government support for his ‘European Assembly’. Attlee and Bevin agreed to a ‘Council of Europe’ with the European Assembly meeting in Strasbourg (p163). In the meantime the ‘European Movement’ was born out of the ‘International Committee’, which had organised the Congress of Europe.
The first meeting of the European Assembly was in August 1949, with representation from Britain (Labour, Conservative and Liberal), France, Benelux and Italy, but not Germany, whose first free elections were scheduled for later in August. Whether to invite Germany after the election was understandably hotly debated.
Despite suffering a minor stroke in Monte Carlo, Churchill lobbied for Germany to be invited to join the Assembly, and in March 1950 the German Federal Republic was invited (p174). The Assembly debated the scope of a European Court of Human Rights, which was eventually signed into being in Rome in 1950 (p178).
The second Assembly was held in August 1950. There were several points of debate. Churchill maintained that a European union should be achieved gradually, not immediately as in the federation championed by Coudenhove-Kalergi. Also, Churchill wanted Britain’s role to be to guide Europe, not to be an integral part of a union. The threats from the Soviet Union in Europe and the Korean War in the Far East made defence the main topic of the Assembly, including the question of whether Germany should be allowed to rearm.
Churchill’s resolution to “recommend the creation of a unified European army” was carried easily (p188). He hoped that any army would be under the umbrella of NATO, which had come into being in April 1949. However, the Assembly did not have the mandate to propose an army. The French plan for a ‘European Defence Community’ (EDC) eventually died in 1954 (p195).
On the economic front, French statesman Robert Schuman had been working on Franco-German cooperation and on 9 May 1950 (now Europe Day) produced the Schuman Declaration, creating a single market in coal and steel between France and Germany. Britain then declined an invitation to join, citing loss of sovereignty.
Churchill stayed away from the third Strasbourg Assembly in 1951 to concentrate on the general election that October. Macmillan’s attempt to introduce a British alternative to the Schuman Plan failed.
Conservatives back in power
Having won the election, the Conservatives had high hopes of guiding the development of Europe again, but the new government, especially Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, with what was dubbed the ‘Eden Plan’, opposed the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan for an EDC (European Defence Community).
In fact, Churchill was about to “let down all Europe” (p214).
But how did this happen? One reason was the gentleman’s agreement that an incoming government would not undo “core decisions of its predecessors” (p216). How times have changed!
Another was that federation had gained such acceptance in Europe and the USA with the Schuman Plan binding Germany to Western Europe, that Churchill could scarcely oppose it. Also, Churchill needed to focus on stabilising the British Empire and discouraging America from retreating into an isolationism that would have allowed Russia to march to the North Sea. Finally, there were domestic problems to be sorted out, principally food, housing and transport.
So Churchill rather abandoned the European cause, and the containment of Russia became his main concern. As Boothby said “his one big idea was a summit with Russia”.
The EDC fails and Germany joins NATO
Anthony Eden, now Foreign Minister, had never espoused Churchill’s European ideas. He penned a memo saying, “Strasbourg was always a misfortune, now it’s nearly a calamity” (p223). Churchill gradually lost the energy and the mental capacity to advance European ideas and by late 1951 was being described as “very, very old, tragically old”. He himself admitted to being “extremely tired”. Then, in June 1953, he suffered a major stroke.
The Eden Plan only paid lip service to the Council of Europe and was described by Peter Thorneycroft as “window dressing”. Despite efforts by Macmillan to propose an alternative, on 27 May 1952, the EDC was signed without Britain. However, the ratification of the EDC by the French was repeatedly postponed. Churchill did try to persuade France to sign, as he saw it as the only way to create a German army and deter the Russians. On the other hand, Churchill tried to arrange a face-to-face meeting with the new Soviet leader, Georgy Malenkov, but he could not persuade the USA to agree to this, nor to Germany becoming part of NATO.
When it became apparent that France was not going to ratify the EDC, Britain and America agreed to Germany joining NATO and the ‘Western European Union’ (previously ‘Western Union’). This agreement became known as the Paris Accords (p256) and was ratified by France in March 1955. A week later, with the post-war European landscape now settled, Churchill resigned as prime minister.
Churchill’s groundwork eventually shows results
Klos then charts events after Churchill resigned. In 1957, Eden gave way to Macmillan, who in 1960 decided to seek membership of the ‘Common Market’. In 1962, Churchill was in hospital with a broken hip. Field Marshal Montgomery, having visited him, stated that Churchill was opposed to Macmillan’s application. This was a deliberate misrepresentation, and Churchill’s secretary made his support clear. Indeed, Churchill was disappointed when in 1963 de Gaulle vetoed British membership of the Common Market (p262).
In 1963, Macmillan appointed Edward Heath as his chief negotiator for a second application. Heath admired Churchill for his European zeal and even showed his staff a film of Churchill’s Zurich speech. Another veto from de Gaulle followed in 1967. When Heath eventually became prime minister, his 1973 application to join the ‘European Economic Community’ was accepted and endorsed in a referendum in 1975.
Klos concludes with a 1959 quote from Churchill “… the outlook for a closer unity for those who share the common fruit of Western civilisation … is full of promise” (p264).
Strangely, Klos does not mention the death of Churchill on 24 January 1965. His state funeral was attended by royalty and political leaders from across Europe, undoubtedly in thanks for promoting the concept of a united Europe, as well as for winning the war.
Postscript
A monumental work of scholarship and dedication. It allows one to understand the arduous path of Britain’s accession to Europe. Such a shame that all was destroyed by the 2016 referendum and our subsequent withdrawal. The European Movement UK will continue to work to reverse this calamitous decision. Like Churchill, I feel I’m “a good European” and shall not rest until we are back in the heart of Europe.
Churchill’s Last Stand – The Struggle to Unite Europe, Felix Klos. Bloomsbury 2017. 336 pages. https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/churchills-last-stand-9781786732927
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